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HIERONYMI, Pamela. Freedom, Resentment, and the Metaphysics of Morals. 
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2020. xx + 168 pp. 
Cloth, $29.95—Contra the dominant readings, Hieronymi—refusing to 
sideline concerns of metaphysics for the impasse of normativity—argues 
that the core of Strawson’s argument in “Freedom and Resentment” rests 
on an implicit and overlooked metaphysics of morals grounded in social 
naturalism, focusing her discussion on Strawson’s conception of objective 
attitudes. The objective attitude deals with exemption, rather than excuse. 
This distinction is critical to Strawson’s picture of responsibility: In 
addition to our personal reactive attitudes are their impersonal or 
vicarious analogues. There are two such cases: first, cases where we 
suspend or modify reactive attitudes due to error about the quality of the 
will. In these cases of excuse, we might include an actor who we learn was 
innocently ignorant, or whose behavior was an accident, and so we see 
that he or she really meant no harm. Consequently, we exculpate the 
injury in question. In cases of excuse, we are mistaken about the quality 
of the actor’s will and, thus, our reactive attitude changes, but the moral 
demands stay. However, one might view other people as equipped with 
mental attributes and as people about whom one is disposed not to 
indulge in with those reactive attitudes of resentment, approbation, and 
so on; this involves viewing others objectively. We encounter these 
scenarios in the case of small children, people suffering from dementia, or 
those with forms of other serious mental illness. This second category 
involves exemption: Rather than reacting with the corresponding reactive 
attitudes, we view those actors—who lack the capacities required to fit 
into the usual system tolerably well—objectively, thereby exempting them 
from the usual demands of ordinary interpersonal relating.  
Strawson speaks of a “resource” as we sometimes shift from a reactive 
to an objective attitude even in cases in which the will is neither immature, 
diseased, nor in extreme or unusual circumstances. These are 
instrumental scenarios of emotional effort, as demonstrated in scenarios 
of emotive disengagement from the stresses of involvement, involving a 
stepping away from the natural reaction to offensive behavior to adopt a 
more objective attitude. Could or should the acceptance of the determinist 
thesis lead us always to look on everyone exclusively this way, where the 
acceptance of determinism could lead to the decay or repudiation of 
“participant reactive attitudes”? 
For Strawson’s unconvinced pessimist—an incompatibilist about moral 
responsibility and freedom—a metaphysics of morals could enumerate an 
argument that starts from claims about the nature of moral requirement 
or moral demand and reach the conclusion that moral demands require a 
form of control, possibility, originality, or spontaneity, which is ruled out 
by the truth of determinism. It would follow that we would universalize 
the objective attitude, applying the “resource” indiscriminately. Absent 
social naturalism, Strawson’s rejection of the pessimist’s moral 
standards—that all ordinary interpersonal relating could fail to meet, 
requiring us to adopt the objective attitude universally—would rest simply 
on his examination of our practices, on his interpretation of cases in 
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which we modify or suspend reactive attitudes. The pessimist trades in 
intermediate moral principles—standards about desert, control, 
alternatives, possibility, and so on—which they present as intuitively 
compelling. However, Strawson’s analysis demands that we go beyond a 
simple appeal to intuition in order support these intermediate principles. 
Why does Strawson think that whether we could or should exempt 
depends on what is “ordinary,” statistically speaking? Consider 
Strawson’s argument that no general thesis could provide a reason to 
exempt everyone from moral demands: We do and should exempt the 
outlier cases, and it cannot be the case that everyone is an outlier. 
Strawson thinks that we have a natural, nonrational commitment to 
engaging in characteristically interpersonal relationships. The quality of 
others’ wills toward us matters to us and are manifest in their behavior 
such that we put some set of demands on the quality of others’ wills; 
accordingly, we will react in certain ways when those demands are 
violated. For Strawson, this fact is naturalized: It is given with human 
society and not something for which there are or need to be reasons. We 
typically engage with others in the characteristically interpersonal way—
the specific demands and reactions are themselves a product of life as it 
actually happens, such that the detail of our system is sensitive to 
statistically typical human capacities and circumstances. 
We sometimes exercise our “resource” so as to opt out of relating. This 
employment of the “objective attitude” can be to avoid the strains of 
involvement, for therapeutic purposes, or for curiosity. However, it 
cannot be the case that everyone is incapable of ordinary relating or that 
everyone is in unusual or extreme circumstances—to say either would be 
to assert a contradiction. The condition worth considering here is whether 
we could or should come to exercise our “resource” at all times and thus 
give up characteristically interpersonal relating (the pessimist seems to 
think so). 
Practically speaking, it seems that it is inconceivable to always use the 
objective attitude. In dealing with the normative question of “should we 
do so,” we see that characteristically interpersonal relating is not done for 
reasons, nor is it something that requires justification, so this question is 
idle. There is a further point that can be made explicit: We can know in 
advance that being determined is not a reason to exempt. We do not shift 
to a more objective attitude because we believe that the person’s behavior 
is determined (that is, forced, caused, fated) if determinism is true. 
Strawson claims that when we do adopt such an objective attitude, our 
doing so is not a consequence of a theoretical conviction. This undercuts 
the generalization strategy, the robust theory that bolsters the pessimist’s 
incompatibilism that “if determinism is true, everyone should be exempt 
for the same reason that we now exempt certain people.” 
Given Strawson’s social naturalism, we can know that the principles 
that govern moral and interpersonal relating will not include the 
contradiction that would require that if we discover an apparent 
contradiction in our principles, we have discovered that we ought to 
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revise our understanding of those principles. Nothing that is true of 
everyone, that is, the thesis of determinism’s application, provides a 
reason to exempt. Even if we could face a choice about whether to 
abandon our commitment to characteristically interpersonal relating—a 
choice that Strawson finds impossible—our reasons for making the 
choice would not be the kind that motivate the pessimist because they 
would not be moral reasons.  
The “crucial objection” is the question of whether the truth of 
determinism should lead us to use our “resource,” repudiate the reactive 
attitudes, and lift all moral and interpersonal demands and expectations, 
even for that which is statistically ordinary. Strawson will see the 
universal use of the resource as indistinguishable from the lifting of all 
demands—universal exempting is impossible because, once the 
suspension of reactive attitudes is universalized, there are no demands 
from which to “exempt.” Strawson’s answer to the “crucial objection” is 
two-part:  
(1) As we are, we cannot adopt an objectivity of attitude to others as a 
result of our theoretical conviction to the truth of determinism. 
(2) When we do adopt an objective attitude, it is not due to the 
theoretical conviction that “determinism is the case” but a consequence 
of our having abandoned ordinary interpersonal attitudes. 
If we were to decide that no one should be held responsible, we would 
have to make this decision for reasons that concern not questions of 
justice but the gains and losses to human life. 
The truth or falsity of determinism has no bearing on this choice. 
Strawson and the pessimist agree that our practices would be inconsistent 
if we exempted only some people because we believe of them something 
we know to be true of everyone. By reflection and reasoning, we can rule 
out the possibility that anything true of everyone is a reason to exempt. 
Reflection can help us better understand the terms of our relating—
reflection reveals to us the principles actually at work. Tasked with 
revising our reasons for exempting in the face of novel scientific/ethical 
discoveries we, via rational reflection, can refine standards, improve 
practices, and supply rules. 
When an inconsistency threatens to undermine an entire system, no 
particular part of the system must retain special authority. Following the 
thread that practice precedes standards and that existence precedes 
essence, Hieronymi notes a difference between standards of regard—by 
which we determine whether one’s “will was ill”—and exempting 
conditions—the conditions that preclude being a participant in the 
framework. Depending on a community’s natural capacities, standards of 
regard adjust to suit actual capacities, rather than everyone in that 
community constantly exempting one another from some set of 
unchanging universal standards of regard. These standards of regard 
adjust because they are the expectations and demands constituted by 
reactive attitudes. Thus the “serious objection”: what it is that prevents 
those standards from adjusting downward? There will be pressures for 
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standards of regard to adjust to the status quo, accommodating the 
tendencies and incapacities of the majority or culturally dominant. A 
“counterpressure” transpires from the needs and interests of those who 
are disadvantaged. 
While demands or expectations that exceed typical natural capacities 
will be met with difficulty, this is not the case for demands for socially 
developed capacities or incapacities (resulting from socialization, 
education, inculturation). Socially developed capacities’ demands can be 
reasonable and sustainable if enough is at stake for those making the 
demand. Even though those ignoring the demand will resist seeing it as 
reasonable, critical purchase within a system often involves those who are 
disadvantaged appealing to consistency, which, paired with appeals to 
needs and interests, can result in change. The same natural human 
commitment to characteristically interpersonal relating that adjusts our 
standards toward the majority or dominant, when in conjunction with the 
needs and interests of individuals and standards of consistency, can 
generate “counterpressure” to maintain and advance certain ideals. 
However, consistency is not enough—spurious claims of being 
“consistent” can be readily fabricated; such development also requires 
empathy, although this could perhaps be understood as included in our 
commitment to ordinary interpersonal relating.—Ekin Erkan, CUNY 
Graduate Center 
HUXFORD, George. Kant and Theodicy: A Search for an Answer to the Problem 
of Evil. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2020. xxiii + 149 pp. Cloth, 
$90.00—Huxford’s book aims to clarify Kant’s understanding of the 
problem of evil by examining Kant’s evolving conception of the task of 
theodicy qua “the challenge to explain how it is possible that there is evil 
in a world created by an all-good, all-knowing, and all-powerful God.” 
Huxford’s thesis is that “Kant was engaged with the subject of theodicy 
throughout his career.” Huxford defends this claim by tracing Kant’s 
approach to theodicy “from early to late career to show not only the 
continuity of Kant’s consideration but also his philosophical development 
on the subject.” 
Huxford divides the development of Kant’s thinking on theodicy into 
three stages: (1) an early, exploratory stage in the 1750s and 1760s, during 
which Kant considers how the theodicies offered by Leibniz and Pope 
might be compatible with Newtonian physics, on one hand, and human 
morality, on the other (chapters 1–3), (2) a middle, transitional stage in 
the 1780s, during which Kant begins to apply the conclusions of Critique 
of Pure Reason to the problem of theodicy (chapters 4–6), and (3) a final, 
concluding stage in the 1790s, during which Kant recognizes the full 
significance of his critical philosophy for the problem of theodicy 
(chapters 7–9). Huxford argues that Kant moves from an early belief in the 
